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【学术通知】悉尼科技大学会计系教授Yaowen Shan:The Dark Side of Corporate Information Search: Evidence from Signals of Adverse Selection by Takeover Target Firms

  • 发布日期:2024-04-18
  • 点击数:

  

喻园管理论坛2024年第41期(总第973期)

演讲主题: The Dark Side of Corporate Information Search: Evidence from Signals of Adverse Selection by Takeover Target Firms

主 讲 人Yaowen Shan,悉尼科技大学会计系教授

主 持 人: 陈平路,会计与财税系教授

活动时间2024年4月23日(周二)10:00-12:00

活动地点管院大楼105室

主讲人简介:

Yaowen Shan,悉尼科技大学会计系教授,研究重点是会计和金融经济学的交叉领域,特别是会计和非会计信息在资本市场监管、公司治理、财务报告和高管薪酬中的作用。近年来其数篇论文已被The Accounting Review、Review of Accounting Studies、Contemporary Accounting Research、Journal of Corporate Finance、Journal of Banking and Finance, Abacus、Accounting and Finance、Australian Journal of Management等重要学术期刊接受发表。他还担任Australian Accounting Review的联合主编,以及Accounting and Finance 、Australian Journal of Management的副主编。同时,在领先的国际会计和金融会议上获得了两项最佳论文奖。他还获得了许多研究资助,总额超过150万澳元,其中包括三项ARC发现资助,以及几项国家竞争性资助,如CIFR和AFAANZ研究资助。

活动简介:

Existing studies document diverse benefits of information search, but company information search can also signal adverse selection. Analyzing takeover targets’ digital footprints in the pre-announcement period, we find that target information search is negatively associated with cumulative abnormal returns following takeover announcements. Our findings are robust to a battery of additional tests and two identification strategies to control for potential endogeneity bias. Information-searching targets also capture lower takeover premiums, which reinforces the prediction that information search activities are associated with a lower target shareholder value around takeover announcements. The negative relationship between information search and target announcement returns is stronger for targets with higher bankruptcy risk and higher CEO ownership, while target-acquirer social ties mitigate this negative effect. Overall, the results highlight that targets’ information search behavior sends signals of adverse selection.

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